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Investment Treaty Arbitration in Cuba
Rafael Cox Alomar*
Not since the fateful days of the 1962 Missile Crisis, has
Cuba commanded as much global attention as it does today.
The 2014 diplomatic rapprochement between the United
States and Cuba, not only did away with the last vestiges of
the Cold War in Caribbean waters, but more importantly has
coincided with a period of acute ideological effervescence in
Havana. Even in the face of President Raúl Castro’s resolute
commitment to the principles of the 1959 Revolution, it is
more than evident that Cuba is in the midst of a transformational moment. And perhaps in no other area of the island’s
institutional life are the winds of change as noticeable as in
Cuba’s new ordre public with respect to Direct Foreign Investment (“DFI”).
Cuba’s immediate uncertainties, compounded by the rather
piecemeal unfolding of its economic negotiations with the
United States, places even more weight on the island’s capacity to attract and maintain a seamless stream of DFI. The
quantity and quality of such inflow will, no doubt, depend on
the credibility and cogency of Cuba’s legal superstructure.
It is precisely against this background, that this Article proposes an innovative reading of Cuba’s bilateral investment
treaties (“BITs”), grounded on a comparative legal analysis

*

Rafael Cox Alomar is an Assistant Professor at the David A. Clarke School of
Law in Washington, D.C.
1

2

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

that brings to the fore the intense, yet often unexplored, interactions between Cuban law, public international law and
investment treaty arbitral jurisprudence.
Part I delineates the substantive elements of Cuba’s Foreign
Investment Act of 2014, and more generally traces the evolution of Cuba’s legal superstructure since the emergence of
the empresa mixta. Part II explores the penumbras of the
dispute settlement mechanisms available in Cuban BITs.
Part III provides a comprehensive analysis of the standard
safeguards available to foreign investments and foreign investors operating in Cuban territory under the protection of
a BIT. Part IV weighs in, both from a legal and policy perspective, on the normative lacunas and structural challenges
besieging Cuba’s investment treaty landscape.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Transformative Moment
Not since the fateful days of the 1962 Missile Crisis, has Cuba
commanded as much global attention as it does today. The 2014 diplomatic rapprochement between the United States and Cuba,1 not
only did away with the last vestiges of the Cold War in Caribbean
waters,2 but more importantly has coincided with a period of acute
ideological effervescence in Havana. Even in the face of President
Raúl Castro’s resolute commitment to the principles of the 1959
Revolution,3 it is more than evident that Cuba is in the midst of a
1

President Eisenhower cut off diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3,
1961. United States severs diplomatic relations with Cuba, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-severs-diplomatic-relations-with-cuba.
2
Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, WHITE HOUSE (Dec.
17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-pr
esident-cuba-policy-changes. President Obama announced that in changing its relationship with Cuba, the United States “will end an outdated approach that, for
decades, has failed to advance our interests . . . the relationship between our countries played out against the backdrop of the Cold War, and America’s steadfast
opposition to communism.” Id.
3
On December 17, 2014, in his response to President Obama’s speech, President Castro said the following words, “since my election as President of the State
Council and Council of Ministers I have reiterated on many occasions our willingness to hold a respectful dialogue with the United States on the basis of sovereign equality . . . [t]his stance was conveyed to the U.S. Government both publicly
and privately . . . stating the willingness to discuss and solve our differences without renouncing any of our principles.” Foreign Staff, Speech by Cuban President
Raul Castro on Re-establishing U.S.-Cuba Relations, WASHINGTON POST (Dec.
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/full-text-speech-by-cuban-pr
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transformational moment. And perhaps in no other area of the island’s institutional life are the winds of change as noticeable as in
Cuba’s new ordre public with respect to Direct Foreign Investment
(“DFI”).
It is no secret that Cuba’s sustainability is wholly contingent on
the decisive expansion of its economy; so far one of Latin America’s
most sluggish due in no small measure to the United States’ unbending blockade. During the last decade, Cuba’s GDP has only grown
1.8% per annum —half the Latin American average.4 Jumpstarting
the Cuban economy, however, will necessarily require annual
growth rates of at least 5% to 7%.5 Against this background, no
growth strategy will succeed in Cuba in the absence of a significant
and constant inflow of DFI, to the tune of $2.0 and $2.5 billion per
annum.6
The recent months, moreover, have brought to bear a renewed
sense of urgency. Venezuela’s tragic implosion, which in turn has
forced authorities in Caracas to stop delivering Havana 99,000 daily
barrels of crude oil, has sent Cuba into a downward spiral.7 During
esident-raul-castro-on-re-establishing-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/45bc2f88-8
616-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html.
4
Cuba Foreign Trade, Chamber of Commerce of the Cuban Republic, January 2015.
5
Note that the 5% to 7% growth figure was suggested at the extraordinary
session of the National Assembly of People’s Power where Cuba’s new Foreign
Investment Act was approved on March 29, 2014, available at http://www.gran
ma.cu/file/pdf/2014/04/16/G_2014041609.pdf. Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Issues
for the 114th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (July 17, 2015),
available at https://cri.fiu.edu/us-cuba/policy/cuba-issues-for-114th-congress.
pdf.
6
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Can Cuba’s Economic Reforms Succeed?,
AMERICAS QUARTERLY, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/can-cubaseconomic-reforms-succeed. It is essential to note, however, that the available empirical data appears to show that there is no direct causal link between a capital
importing country’s success in attracting high levels of DFI and the sheer number
of investment treaties it signs. An aggressive treaty-signing agenda is but one of
a myriad of elements impacting a sovereign’s effectiveness in importing foreign
capital. For an illuminating analysis of these dynamics see Lisa E. Sachs & Karl
P. Sauvant, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTME
NT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION
TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Oxford University Press, 2009).
7
Franz Von Bergen, Venezuela Cuts Oils Shipments to Cuba Forcing Castro
to Consider Veering to U.S., FOX NEWS (July 27, 2016), http://latino.foxnews.c
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the first semester of 2016, Cuba’s GDP only grew by 1%—half of
what the Cuban government had initially projected.8 Not surprisingly, President Raúl Castro has warned the National Assembly of
People’s Power of tough times ahead.9
Cuba’s immediate uncertainties, compounded by the rather
piecemeal unfolding of its economic negotiations with the United
States, places even more weight on the island’s capacity to attract
and maintain a seamless stream of DFI. The quantity and quality of
such inflow will, no doubt, depend on the credibility and cogency of
Cuba’s legal superstructure.
B. The Roadmap
It is precisely against this background, that this Article proposes
an innovative reading of Cuba’s bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”), grounded on a comparative legal analysis that brings to
the fore the intense, yet often unexplored, interactions between Cuban law, public international law, and BIT arbitral jurisprudence.
Part I delineates the substantive elements of Cuba’s Foreign Investment Act of 2014 (“FIA”), and more generally traces the evolution
of Cuba’s legal superstructure since the emergence of the empresa
mixta. Part II explores the penumbras of the dispute settlement
mechanisms available in Cuban BITs. Part III provides a comprehensive analysis of the standard safeguards available to foreign investments and foreign investors operating in Cuban territory under
the protection of a BIT. Part IV weighs in, both from a legal and
policy perspective, on the normative lacunas and structural challenges ingrained in Cuba’s investment treaty landscape.

om/latino/news/2016/07/27/venezuela-cuts-oils-shipments-to-cuba-forcing-cast
ros-to-consider-veer-to-us/.
8
Raúl Castro: El pueblo cubano crecerá frente a las dificultades, YOUTUBE
(July 8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOA2vZCBVwo (last visited
Apr. 15, 2017).
9
Id.
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II. CUBA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT OF 2014
A.

The Geopolitical Jigsaw Puzzle
Cuba’s DFI policy has undergone significant, yet slow, change
throughout the last 40 years. Driven more by sheer necessity than
choice, the tortuous evolution of Cuba’s approach to DFI cannot be
divorced from the wider geopolitical imperatives shaping Cuban life
with ferocious intensity ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
concomitant demise of the Soviet Union. The island’s 2014 FIA is
but the most recent stride, in a long continuum of discontinuous
steps, aimed at inserting Cuba to the global economy. Cuba’s obvious intention to articulate an autochthonous market-economy premised on the Chinese and Vietnamese hybrid models adds, then, a
considerable degree of complexity to a process fraught with significant uncertainty.
B. An Evolving Legal Framework
The first conspicuous attempt at easing the normative rigidity of
the 1976 Constitution10 came to life with the enactment in 1982 of
Decree-Law No. 50,11 which brought to life the Cuban empresa

10
Article 1 of the 1976 Constitution makes it plain clear that “Cuba is a Socialist State of workers, independent and sovereign, organized by all and for the
good of all, as a unified and democratic republic, for the enjoyment of political
freedom, social justice, individual and collective welfare and human solidarity.”
More specifically, Article 14 establishes that in Cuba “the economic system is
based on the people’s socialist ownership of all fundamental means of production
and on the suppression of all forms of human exploitation.” Article 15, for its part,
forbids natural or legal persons from holding an ownership interest on land, except
for small farmers. Such constitutional provision insists that the Cuban subsoil,
mines, all natural resources, forests, waterways, sugar mills, factories, modes of
transportation, all nationalized banks, as well as scientific, cultural and sports installations belong to the Cuban Republic and title over them cannot be transferred
to natural or legal persons. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA arts. 1, 14,
15 (1976), as amended (2002) (CUBA CONST.).
11
DECRETO-LEY No. 50 (Cuba 1982). Decree-Law 50 entered into full force
and effect in Cuba on February 15, 1982 (“Sobre asociación económica entre
entidades cubanas y extranjeras”).
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mixta, or “joint venture.”12 The unveiling of the empresa mixta resulted from Cuba’s strategic calculus, at the time, to buttress its sagging export and tourism sectors.13 This notwithstanding, the birth of
the empresa mixta did not do away with the principle of non-transferability of Cuban property to foreign hands entrenched in the 1976
Constitution. At most, the Cuban partner of the empresa mixta could
only convey proprietary rights to its foreign counterparts by means
of a lease or usufruct.14
Soon thereafter, the colossal fall of the Communist bloc and the
brutality of the so-called Cuban special period15 led to a second
wave of institutional tinkering. This time the reform was of constitutional magnitude.16 It led, inter alia, to the incorporation in 1992
of both the empresa mixta and the asociaciones económicas into the
Cuban Constitution.17 Under the newly ratified Article 23,18 the Cuban Republic openly recognized the proprietary rights inherent to
the empresa mixta and the asociaciones económicas.19
12
Natacha Mesa Tejeda, “Modalidades de la Inversión Extranjera: La Empresa Mixta,” Inversión Extranjera, LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO
1 (2015) (Cuba).
13
Emilio Marill, “Respaldo Constitucional a las Inversiones Extranjeras,
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 10, 41 (Dec. 1995) (Cuba).
14
Juan Vega Vega, Comentarios a la legislación cubana sobre asociaciones
económicas con empresarios extranjeros, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 5, 2930 (Mar. 1992) (Cuba).
15
Cuba’s special period occurred from 1989 until the late 1990s when Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez agreed to supply Cuba’s fuel needs. During these
years Cuba saw, for example, an alarming collapse of its import activity. In 1993
alone Cuba imported 75% less than in 1989. Alarming rates of inflation and a
massive exodus of young Cubans brought economic growth to a halt.
16
On October 10, 1991, the Communist Party’s IV Congress opened the door
for amending the 1976 Constitution. The Party’s directive led the National Assembly of People’s Power to ratify, on July 12, 1992, the above-referenced
amendments to the constitutional text. See Elections and Events 1991-2001, UC
SAN DIEGO, http://libraries.ucsd.edu/collections/about/collections-of-distinction/l
atin-american-elections-statistics/cuba/elections-and-events-19912001.html (last
visited Mar. 30).
17
CUBA CONST. (amended 2002).
18
CUBA CONST. art. 23. (2002) (“El Estado reconoce la propiedad de las empresas mixtas, sociedades y asociaciones económicas que se constituyen conforme a la ley.”).
19
Id. Note that the parties entering into an asociación económica do not lose
their independent legal personality, as is the case in the empresa mixta model.
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Both the enactment by Cuban authorities of the 1995 Foreign
Investment Act20 and their unleashing of an aggressive BIT-drafting
strategy, which took off in 1993 with the signing of the Cuban-Italian treaty, stand as the progeny of the 1991-92 unfinished agenda.
The 2014 Foreign Investment Act,21 thus, is the culmination of a
long-winded evolutionary process.22
C. Cuban Foreign Investment Law Today
Enacted close to nine months before President Obama’s December 2014 speech,23 Cuba’s FIA is in many respects a more refined
and user-friendly statute than its predecessor.
As a threshold matter, it is essential to note that the definition of
“foreign investment” under Article 12 of the FIA includes both direct and indirect investments.24 Thus, indirect ownership of shares
in a local subsidiary constitutes a “protected investment” under the
Cuban legislation. Article 13.1, for its part, identifies the three modalities of foreign investment recognized under Cuban law, namely,
the joint venture (empresa mixta), the international economic association agreement (contrato de asociación económica internacional), and the totally foreign capital company (empresa de capital
totalmente extranjero).25

20

LEY 77 (1995) (Cuba). This statute was enacted on Sept. 5, 1995.
The 2014 Foreign Investment Act was passed by the National Assembly of
People’s Power on March 29, 2014, and published in a special issue of the Official
Gazette of the Cuban Republic on April 16, 2014. It entered into full force and
effect in Cuba on June 28, 2014. Luis M. Alcalde, Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law, KEGLER, BROWN, HILL & RITTER (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.keglerbr
own.com/publications/cubas-new-foreign-investment-law/.
22
By the end of 2014, Cuba was attracting a constant stream of DFI in the
following sectors: tourism and real estate (52%), energy and mining (11%), industry (10%), food (5%), transportation (5%), agro-sugar (5%), construction (4%)
and others (8%). Cuba: Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment, LA
HABANA: MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA,
12 (2015) (Cuba).
23
Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, supra note 2.
24
LEY 118 art. 12(b) (2014) (Cuba). Article 12(b) reads as follows, “investments in equities or other securities or bonds, either public or private, which do
not fall under the definition of direct investment.”
25
At the close of 2014, 50% of all foreign investment in Cuba was organized
as a joint venture or empresa mixta, 45% as an international economic association
21
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The empresa mixta, as suggested earlier, is a corporation controlled by foreign and domestic shareholders. The empresa mixta
will have no legal personality until the filing of its constitutive public deed with the Cuban Business Register.26 The FIA also requires
the public deed include the corporation’s bylaws and copy of the
government’s authorization to proceed with the given project.27
Contrary to the 1995 legislation, the FIA does extend the radius
of action of the contrato de asociación económica internacional to
new economic sectors such as hotel administration and professional
services.28 The empresa de capital totalmente extranjero, while also
required to file a public deed with the Cuban Business Register, has
no local partners.29
The FIA explicitly guarantees that the benefits granted to foreign
investors and their investments in Cuba shall remain unchanged for
the duration of the period for which they were conceded.30 The FIA
explicitly authorizes the totally foreign capital company to establish
offices, branches, and subsidiaries both on Cuban soil and abroad.31
Similar to the substantive safeguards available in BIT’s, the FIA
also guarantees the protection and security of the foreign investment.32 Likewise, the FIA extends foreign investments on Cuban
soil protection against wrongful expropriations,33 while safeguarding the free transfer of the dividends or profits derived from them.34
The free transfer protection is further strengthened by the FIA’s
banking and tax provisions. On the one hand, Article 25.1 establishes that foreign investors shall be entitled to open bank accounts

agreement and 5% as a totally foreign capital company. Cuba: Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment, supra note 22, at 12.
26
LEY 118 art. 14.1(6) (2014) (Cuba).
27
Id. at art. 14.1(4).
28
Cuba Foreign Trade, supra note 4, at 10.
29
LEY 118 art. 16.1(2) (Cuba).
30
Id. at art. 3.
31
Id. at art.1.1(3).
32
Id. at art. 4.1.
33
Id.
34
LEY 118 art. 9.1 (Cuba).
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in any banking institution belonging to Cuba’s National Bank System.35 On the other, Article 35 exempts the foreign investor from
personal tax liability for profits or dividends.36
In Cuba all foreign investment projects require governmental authorization. Admittedly, this amounts to a highly centralized statedriven process conducted at the highest echelons of the Cuban Republic. Depending on the nature of the project and the economic
sector involved, the foreign investor will be required to seek authorization either from the Council of State37 or the Council of Ministers.38
Council of State approval is required for all foreign investment
projects intending to explore or exploit non-renewable natural resources; run the most essential public services in the transportation,
communications, water or power sectors; construct public works;
and/or exploit a public good.39
Council of Ministers authorization, furthermore, is required
whenever the foreign investment project touches upon a real estate
development; the transfer of state proprietary rights; a risk agreement for the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources; the
participation of a foreign company partly financed by state funds;

35

Id. at art. 25.1.
Id. at art. 35.
37
Note that the 1976 Constitution redesigned Cuba’s governmental architecture, ratifying the island’s definitive abandonment of the traditional republican
form of government. A National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea
Nacional del Poder Popular) was now erected as the “supreme organ” of the Cuban Republic. Elected to 5-year terms, the deputies of the National Assembly of
People’s Power select from among their peers the members of the Council of
State. The 1976 Constitution designates the president of the Council of State as
head of state of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The
Council of State has authority to, inter alia, enact decree-laws; render legally
binding opinions on all applicable laws; declare war in case of aggression; ratify
and denounce international treaties; and designate and remove ambassadors.
CUBA CONST. arts. 69, 72 (2002).
38
The membership of the Council of Ministers is chosen by the President of
the Council of State, who sits as its President. Among the Council of Ministers’
attributions are the following: conduct the foreign relations and the foreign trade
of the Republic; sign international treaties; prepare the budget; and regulate the
Republic’s monetary policy. Id. at art. 98.
39
LEY 118 art. 21.1(2) (a-b) (Cuba).
36
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the use of renewable energy; the management of healthcare, education and defense institutions; and all other foreign investments not
requiring Council of State approval.40
Of significance is the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism
included in the FIA is considerably narrow in scope. Article 60.1
establishes that,
[t]he conflicts which may arise in the relationship between the partners of a joint venture or between national and foreign investors, which are parties to international economic association agreements, or between partners of a totally foreign capital company
in the form of a corporation with registered shares,
shall be resolved as agreed in the constituent documents, except in the cases referred to in this Chapter.41
Excepted from arbitration under the FIA are those disputes arising in connection to the winding up, dissolution, termination and
inactivity of the governing bodies of a joint venture, an international
economic association, or a totally foreign capital company.42 The
Economic Division of the corresponding Cuban Provincial Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over these conflicts.43 Similarly, disputes
arising in the relationship between the partners of a joint venture, a
totally foreign capital company, or an international economic association agreement with authorization to develop an investment project related to natural resources, public services, and/or public
works, also fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Economic Division of the relevant Provincial Court.44 Moreover, litigation over
the parties’ performance of their respective obligations under the
joint venture, the totally foreign capital company, or the international economic association agreement can proceed either before the
Economic Division of the corresponding Cuban Provincial Court or

40
41
42
43
44

Id. at art. 21.1(3) (a-h).
Id. at art. 60.1 (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 60.1(3).
Id. at art. 60.1(3).
LEY 118 art. 60.1(4).
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before an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Cuban domestic law.45
Contrary to, for instance, the Albanian or Salvadorian foreign
investment statutes,46 both of which openly offer consent to investment treaty arbitration, Cuba’s FIA does not bestow on the foreign
investor standing to elevate an international arbitral claim against
the Cuban Republic.47 Cuba’s consent to investment treaty arbitration, as shall be seen below, is to be found in its vast corpus of bilateral investment treaties.
III. SETTLING INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES WITH THE CUBAN
REPUBLIC
A. Consent to Investment Treaty Arbitration
In the context of investment treaty arbitration, no other threshold
question is as essential as the sovereign’s consent to appear before
the arbitral tribunal. More often than not, sovereigns offer their consent to arbitration by any of the following three channels: domestic
legislation, specific contractual arrangements with foreign investors, or through bilateral or multilateral investment treaties with the
foreign investors’ country of origin.48 While Chapter XVII (Conflict
45

Id. at art. 61.
Law No. 7764 art. 8 (1993) (Alb.); LEY DE INVERSIONES, art. 15 (1999) (El
Sal.). For a rendition on the breadth of the Albanian and Salvadorean foreign investment statutes refer to Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 173-4 (Dec. 24, 1996); and Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 331-32 (Aug.
2, 2006), respectively.
47
See Narciso Cobo Roura, Conflictos e Inversión Extranjera: Un Comentario, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 155
(2015) (Cuba).
48
See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 2d edition, 254-64 (Oxford University Press 2012) (for a general
discussion of the various procedural modalities for tendering consent); Menzies
Middle East and Africa S.A. et. al. v. République du Sénégal, ICSID Case No.
ARB 15/21, Award, ¶ 130 (Aug. 5, 2016) (“un Etat souverain ne peut pas être
assujetti à une jurisdiction internationale sans son consentement clairement exprimé et non-équivoque.”); M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, INC. v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, ¶ 323 (July 31, 2007)
(“Under general international law, any obligation to submit for arbitration a dispute involving a State requires the existence of an agreement. That agreement,
46
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Resolution) of Cuba’s FIA does contain a dispute settlement mechanism, it does not grant foreign investors carte blanche to sue Cuba
before international tribunals.49 Cuba’s consent to investment treaty
arbitration,50 however, is found in the multitude of BITs it has entered into since 1993. The catalogue of Cuban BITs is incredibly
diverse. So far, Cuba has signed investment treaties with, inter alia,
Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, BelgiumLuxembourg, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
which may be verbal, must be proven by the party alleging it.”). Of relevance is
the fact that there appears to be a discrepancy among arbitral tribunals on whether
to apply the heightened “clear and unambiguous” standard or the more liberal
yardstick of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(ratified by Cuba on Sept. 9, 1998) in determining the existence of an arbitration
agreement. See Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. et al. (Formerly Renta 4 S.V.S.A et
al.) v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Separate Opinion of Charles
N. Brower, ¶ 7 (Mar. 20 2009) (for an overview of this debate), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31-32, ratified by Cuba on Sept. 9, 1998, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33. Also see Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 198 (Feb. 8, 2005).
49
LEY 118 Chapter XVII (Cuba).
50
Cuba’s legal culture is no stranger to arbitration. The 1855 Spanish Law of
Civil Procedure, extended to Cuba in 1866, drew a distinction between judges and
arbitrators and did enable the parties to choose arbitration as their dispute settlement mechanism. See Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil de España, islas de Cuba y
Puerto Rico, Madrid: Librería de la Viuda e Hijos de D.J. Cuesta, 398-412 (1867).
It is essential to note, moreover, that the Spanish legislation applicable to Cuba
during the colonial period was heavily influenced, inter alia, by the Siete Partidas,
which as early as the 13th century did provide for the appointment of arbitrators
and comunales amigos to resolve disputes within the terms of reference agreed by
the parties. See 3d Partida art. I (Que habla de la justicia, de cómo se ha de hacer
ordenadamente en todo lugar, por palabra de juicio y por obra de hecho). See
Madaline W. Nichols, Las Siete Partidas, 20 CAL. L. REV. 260, 273-6 (1932) (for
a relevant reading of the 3rd Partida). See DECRETO-LEY 250 (Cuba) (which established the Cuban Court of International Commercial Arbitration, the successor to
the old Cuban Arbitration Court for Foreign Trade, or Corte Cubana de Arbitraje
de Comercio Exterior, created under Law No. 1148 of September 15, 1965 as an
organ of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce). See also RESOLUTION No. 15 (Cuba).
Of significance is the fact that Cuba ratified the Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration as early as January 7, 1964 and similarly acceded
to the New York Convention on December 30, 1974 --- which entered into full
force and effect on Cuban soil on March 30, 1975. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Apr. 21, 1961)
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Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, the
Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Angola.51 With 62
BITs in full force and effect around the world,52 and in light of the
ever increasing volumes of DFI reaching its shores, time is of the
essence for scrutinizing the legal depth and breadth of Cuba’s investment treaties.
While dissimilar in linguistic structure and choice of words, the
consent language included in the various Cuban treaties offers the
foreign investor doing business in Cuba the possibility of elevating
to the international plane his or her legal claim against the Cuban
Republic. Binding and unequivocal, Cuban consent is not premised
on the foreign investor’s arbitrary fulfillment of conditions precedent.53 Article 9(4)of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, for instance,
openly provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party hereby consents to
submit investment disputes for resolution to the alternative dispute
settlement fora mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”54 Similarly,
Article 10(2) of the Cuba-Greece BIT explicitly suggests that
“[e]ach Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of such

51
Investment Policy Hub, UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/52 (last visited Mar. 30).
52
According to Professor Juan Mendoza Díaz, Cuba has entered into 63
BITs, of which 62 are in force today. Only the treaty with Ecuador is no longer in
effect, due to the Ecuadorian government’s 2008 denunciation. Unsurprisingly, a
sizeable proportion of Cuban BITs came to life during the so-called special period,
following the decisive demise of the communist bloc. See Juan Mendoza Díaz,
Cuba y el Arbitraje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN
EXTRANJERA LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 167-8 (2015). See also
Mendoza Díaz, Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA
CUBANA DE DERECHO 39, 14-15 (2012).
53
See generally LEY 18 (Cuba).
54
Under the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, the available arbitral fora are the ICC
Court of International Arbitration and an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the procedural rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Cuba,
Cuba-Neth., art. 9(4), Nov. 2, 1999 [hereinafter Cuba-Netherlands BIT].
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dispute to international arbitration.”55 On equal terms, Article 9(3)
of Cuba’s treaty with Romania establishes that “[e]ach Contracting
Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to
international conciliation or arbitration.”56 Even more forcefully,
Article 12(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT states in no uncertain terms
that “[e]ach Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration….”57
Article 8(2) of the Cuban-Chilean treaty incorporates the CubanAustrian approach, suggesting that “cada Parte Contratante da su
consentimiento anticipado e irrevocable para que toda diferencia
pueda ser sometida a este arbitraje.”58 This notwithstanding, the
immense majority of Cuban BITs offer consent to arbitration by
means of more succinct phrases, such as the ‘foreign investor “shall
be entitled,”59 “may submit,”60 “podrá remitir,”61

55

Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic (of Greece)
and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Cuba-Greece, art. 10(2), June 18, 1996 [hereinafter
Cuba-Greece BIT].
56
Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of
the Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Cuba-Rom., art. 9(3), Jan. 27, 1996 [hereinafter Cuba-Romania BIT].
57
Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Cuba for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cuba-Austria, art. 12(1), May 19,
2000 [hereinafter Cuba-Austria BIT].
58
Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Cuba for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cuba-Chile, art. 8(2),
Jan. 10, 1996 [hereinafter Cuba-Chile BIT]. Roughly translates to “[e]ach Contracting Party gives its irrevocable advance consent for any dispute to be submitted to this arbitration.”
59
See art. 8(2) of the Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Cuba-Hung., Oct. 22, 1999 [hereinafter Cuba-Hungary BIT]; art. 8(2) of the
Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government
of the Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cuba-Slovk., Mar. 22, 1997 [hereinafter Cuba-Slovakia BIT].
60
Agreement Between The Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Cuba On
The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Leb-Cuba. art. 7(2),
Dec. 14, 1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Lebanon BIT].
61
Agreement Between The Republic of Guatemala and the Republic of Cuba
On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Guat.-Cuba., art.
VIII(2), Aug. 20, 1999, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Guatemala BIT]; See also
Agreement Between The Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Cuba On The
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“podrá someter,”62 “poderá submeter”63 the dispute to investment
treaty arbitration.’ Other grammatical constructions include the use
of phrases such as, the dispute “shall be submitted,”64 “can be submitted,”65 “será sometida,”66 “podrá ser sometida,”67 il est
soumis . . . à l’arbitrage,”68 “être soumis à l’arbitrage international,”69

Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Bol.-Cuba., art. VIII(2),
May. 6, 1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Bolivia BIT].
62
Agreement Between The Republic of Mexico and the Republic of Cuba On
The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Mex.-Cuba., art. 4(1),
May. 30, 2001, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Mexico BIT].
63
Agreement Between The Republic of Portugal And the Republic of Cuba
On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Port.-Cuba., art.
9(2), Jul. 8, 1998, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Portugal BIT].
64
Agreement Between The Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Cuba
On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Indon.-Cuba., art.
VIII(2), Sept. 19, 1992, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Indonesia BIT]; Republic of
Spain and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of
Investments, Spain-Cuba., art. XI(2), May. 27, 1994, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter CubaSpain BIT]; Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Viet.-Cuba., art. 8(2), Oct. 12,
1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Vietnam BIT]; The United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Gr. Brit.-Cuba., art. 8(1), Jan. 30, 1995,
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-United Kingdom BIT]; Barbados and the Republic
of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Gr. Brit.Cuba., art. 8(1), Feb. 19, 1996, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Barbados BIT].
65
Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Turk.-Cuba., art. VI(2), Dec. 22, 1997,
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Turkey BIT].
66
Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Venez.-Cuba., art. 9(1), Dec. 11, 1996,
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Venezuela BIT].
67
Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion And
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Arg.-Cuba., art. 9(2), Nov. 30, 1995,
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Argentina BIT].
68
French Republic and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Fr.-Cuba., art. 10, Apr. 25, 1997, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-France BIT].
69
Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Switz.-Cuba., art. 10(1), June 28, 1996,
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Switzerland BIT].
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“essa potrà essere sottoposta a scelta dell’investitore,”70 among
others.
B. Amicable Settlement and Notice of Claim
Besides proving Cuba’s consent to international arbitration, the
foreign investor raising a BIT claim against Cuba will also have to
adhere to the various and dissimilar procedural requirements found
in most Cuban investment treaties.
First and foremost, Cuba’s BITs, almost invariably, require that
the foreign investor and the Cuban Republic attempt to amicably
settle their dispute before resorting to domestic litigation or investment treaty arbitration.71 Article 10(1) of the Cuba-Greece BIT mandates that “[d]isputes . . . shall, if possible, be settled by the disputing parties in an amicable way.”72 Article 9(1) of the treaty with the
Netherlands also directs that “[d]isputes . . . shall, whenever possible, be settled amicably between the parties concerned.”73 Likewise,
the treaties with the United Kingdom and Barbados explicitly command that only disputes “which have not been amicably settled”74
shall be submitted to arbitration. The Cuba-Italy BIT reproduces the
70

Republic of Italy and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments It.-Cuba., art. 10(2), May. 7, 1993, I.C.S.I.D.
[hereinafter Cuba-Italy BIT].
71
There appears to be a consensus among international arbitral tribunals suggesting that the requirement of friendly consultations is procedural, as opposed to
jurisdictional, in nature. See, for instance, République D’Italie v. République de
Cuba, Arbitrage Ad’Hoc, Sentence Preliminaire, 15 mars, 2005, ¶ 75 (“[L]e Tribunal Arbitral estime que le non-respect par la République d’Italie de la lettre de
l’Article 10(2) de l’Accord ne justifie pas que sa demande d’arbitrage soit déclarée irrecevable [ . . . ].”) Also see Teinver S.A. et. al. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, December 21, 2012, ¶ 108
(“The Tribunal agrees with Claimants that Article X(1) [of the Argentina-Spain
BIT] can fairly be interpreted as a general ‘best efforts’ obligation for the parties
to attempt to amicably settle their dispute.”) Note, moreover, that Cuba’s participation in friendly consultations with a foreign investor would not preclude it from
objecting to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction once the arbitration proceeding is
instituted. See, e.g., Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira v. Republic of Chile,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7, Award, August 21, 2007, ¶ 200.
72
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(1).
73
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(1).
74
See Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); see also Barbados-Cuba BIT, supra note 64 at art. 8(1).
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same principle, “[l]e controversie . . . dovranno, per quanto possibile, essere risolte amichevolmente fra le parti in causa.”75
Most Cuban BITs set specific timetables for the unfolding of the
friendly consultations.76 Under the overwhelming majority of these
treaties, the consultation window remains open for six months from
the date the foreign investor notifies the Cuban authorities of his or
her claim,77 although shorter periods of three months are not uncommon.78 The absence of a negotiated settlement, at the end of the consultation period, triggers the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism.
The Cuban treaties are far from homogenous with respect to the
tendering of proper notice.79 While some require the foreign investor
75
See Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 9(1). Roughly translates to “[t]
he dispute . . . shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties.”
76
There is a long line of arbitral authority supporting the proposition that
failure to comply with the friendly consultations requirement does not lead to a
finding of lack of jurisdiction. See, for instance, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul
v. Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, September 2, 2009, ¶ 156 (“[ . . . ] even if Claimant failed to
comply with the three-month period, it does not affect the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
or the admissibility of the claims brought by Claimant.”) Also see to Lauder v.
The Czech Republic, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Final Award, September 3, 2001, ¶ 187
(“[ . . . ] this requirement of a six-month waiting period . . . is not a jurisdictional
provision . . . but a procedural rule that must be satisfied by the Claimant.”) There
exists, however, arbitral authority to the contrary. See e.g., Enron Corporation
and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 14, 2004, ¶ 88 (“[ . . . ] the conclusion reached is not because the six-month negotiation period could be a procedural
and not a jurisdictional requirement [ . . . ]. Such requirement is in the view of the
Tribunal very much a jurisdictional one. A failure to comply with that requirement
would result in a determination of lack of jurisdiction.”)
77
See Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10; Cuba- Romania BIT, supra
note 56, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(2); Cuba-Bolivia
BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2);
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Germany BIT art. 11(2);
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2); Cuba- Spain BIT, supra note
64, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Peru BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art.
VI(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra
note 55, at art. 10(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT art. 8(2).
78
See Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(1); Cuba-Barbados
BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art.
8(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra
note 58, at art. 8(2).
79
Note that a considerable number of international arbitral tribunals have
found that absence of proper notice “does not, in and of itself, affect the Tribunal’s
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submits the Cuban authorities a written notification,80 along with a
detailed report of grievances,81 others remain silent as to the execution of specific formalities.82
C. Selecting the Proper Forum
The uneventful expiration of the period of amicable consultations grants the foreign investor standing to formally submit the dispute to the relevant adjudicatory body. The typical Cuban BIT allows the foreign investor to select the legal forum where to litigate
the claim, from among the following three choices: namely the competent Cuban domestic court,83 the Court of International Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (“ICC”),
and an international ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the procedural
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”).84 The dispute settlement menu of Cuba’s BITs,
jurisdiction.” See Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/2, Order, March 16, 2006, ¶ 7.
80
See Cuba’s BIT’s inter alia Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at
art. 8(1); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra
note 70, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Vietnam BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note
60, at art. 7(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Indonesia
BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2).
81
Cuba–Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(1) (“shall be notified in writing, including a [sic.] detailed information”); Cuba–Spain BIT, supra note 64, at
art. XI(1) (“shall be communicated in writing, together with a detailed report by
the investor to the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was
made.”).
82
See Cuba’s BIT’s with, inter alia, Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at
art. 9(1); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 11(1); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra
note 58, at art. 8(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); CubaRomania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9(1); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art.
IX(1); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra
note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Peru
BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT,
supra note 67, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, art. 8(2); CubaNetherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2).
83
Arbitration and Mediation: Impartial Forums to Resolve International
Commercial Disputes in Cuba, Assoc. Study Cuban Econ., available at
http://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/arbitration-mediation-impartial-forums-resolve-international-commercial-disputes-cuba/, (Nov. 30, 2010) (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
84
See e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art.
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however, is not homogenous. Under Article 10 of the Cuba-France
BIT, for instance, the only forum available to the foreign investor is
an ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunal.85 Likewise, Article 11 of the CubaGermany BIT makes it clear that the only option available to the
aggrieved foreign investor is an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the
procedural rules of its own choosing.86 Somewhat similarly, the Cuban-Italian treaty also offers the foreign investor the possibility of
submitting the dispute to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal,87 but differently
from Cuba’s agreement with Germany, it does leave the door open
to domestic litigation before Cuban courts.88
Cuba’s treaties with Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru,
like their German and Italian counterparts, leave the foreign investor
free to choose between a Cuban domestic court and an international
arbitral tribunal, with the caveat that the former ones explicitly designate the UNCITRAL arbitration rules as the lex arbitri.89 Interestingly, the Cuban-Lebanese and the Cuban-Romanian treaties, while
also showing a distinct preference for the UNCITRAL arbitration
rules, adopt a more deferential approach to the autonomy of the parties; designating them as lex arbitri “unless otherwise agreed upon
by the parties to the dispute.”90 The treaty with Chile takes this approach a step further, leaving it entirely to the parties to choose be-

10(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra
note 57, at art. 11(1); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2).
85
Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10. (“l’arbitrage d’un tribunal ad
hoc établi conformément au réglement d’arbitrage de la Commission des Nations
Unies pour le droit commercial international (CNUDCI).”).
86
See also, Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 10(5). (“Im übrigen
regelt das Schiedsgericht sein Verfahren selbst.”)
87
Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art.10(5). (“Il Tribunale Arbitrale stabilirà le propie modalità di procedura.”).
88
Id. at art 9(2)(a). (“A tribunale competente, nei suoi, successivi gradi, della
Parte Contraente sul cui territorio è sorta la controversia.”).
89
Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(3)); Cuba-Venezuela BIT,
supra note 66, at art. 9(3); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(2)(b);
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 8(2)(b); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64,
at art. 8(2)(b).
90
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(2)(b); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9(2)(b).
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tween an international arbitral tribunal, under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and a completely ad hoc arbitral tribunal with authority
to adopt the lex arbitri of its choice.91
The ICC remains, however, the preferred arbitral forum for most
foreign investors operating in Cuba;92 not surprisingly, a considerable number of Cuban BITs do provide for ICC arbitration.93
Of seminal significance, moreover, is the fact that despite its
long-standing antipathy to the World Bank, and its organs, Cuba’s
BITs with Mexico94 and Switzerland95 do leave the door wide open,
pending the agreement of the parties, to the use of the Additional
Facility Rules (“Additional Facility Rules”) adopted by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”).96 Equally importantly, in its treaties with Austria,97 Germany,98 Portugal,99

91

Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(2)(b)(c).
Professor Mendoza Díaz suggests that the immense majority of Cuban investor state arbitrations have been submitted to the ICC. Mendoza Díaz, Cuba y
el Arbitraje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA
HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 169 (2015). Also refer to Mendoza
Díaz, Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA CUBANA DE
DERECHO 39, 16 (2012) (Cuba).
93
See Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(3)(a); Cuba-Netherlands
BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2)(b); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(2);
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(3)(i); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra
note 59, at art. 8(2)(a); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art.VIII(2)(c);
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at Appendix art. 4(1)(c); Cuba-Turkey BIT,
supra note 65, at art. VI(2)(b); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art.
10(2)(b); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2)(b); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2)(a); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art.
8(2)(a); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 11(1)(c)(ii).
94
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, App. art. 4(1)(d).
95
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(2)(a). Mécanisme supplémentaire pour l’administration de procédures de conciliation, d’arbitrage et
de constatation des faits.
96
The Additional Facility Rules, adopted in 1978 by ICSID’s Administrative
Council, see RUDOLF DOLZER, CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, Principles of International
Investment Law 240 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2012). see also
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (ed.), The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 147-48
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009).
97
See Ad art. 11, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Austria BIT.
98
See Ad art. 11, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Germany BIT.
99
See Ad art. 9(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Portugal BIT.
92
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France,100 the Netherlands,101 Hungary,102 Turkey,103 Guatemala,104
Venezuela,105 and Peru,106 Cuba has agreed to the incorporation of
binding protocols enabling foreign investors to submit to ICSID
their investment treaty claims against the Cuban Republic, provided
Cuba were to, in future, become a contracting party to the ICSID
Convention.107
On the question of the foreign investor’s autonomy to select the
arbitral forum, Cuba’s treaties with the United Kingdom and Switzerland present a rather unusual challenge in requiring the parties to
agree to a forum on the basis of consensus.108 Only if no agreement
is reached,109 within a period of three months following notification
of the claim, can the foreign investor submit the dispute to an ad hoc
international arbitral tribunal under the arbitration rules of the
UNCITRAL.110

100

See Ad art. 10, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-France BIT.
See Ad art. 9, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Netherlands BIT.
102
See Ad art. 8(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Hungary BIT.
103
See Ad art. VI, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Turkey BIT.
104
See Ad art. VIII(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Guatemala BIT.
105
See Ad art. 9, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Venezuela BIT.
106
See Ad art. 8(2)(b), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Peru BIT.
107
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (the
“ICSID Convention”). Note that Cuba has not signed the ICSID Convention. Refer to Professor Mendoza’s observations in Juan Mendoza Díaz, Cuba y el Arbitraje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA HABANA:
INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 168 (2015). Also refer to Juan Mendoza Díaz,
Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO
39, 15 (2012). Similarly, Cuba is not a signatory of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration signed in Panama on January 30,
1975 under the aegis of the Organization of American States (commonly referred
to as the Panama Convention).
108
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Switzerland
BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(2).
109
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2). While mirroring the language of the above-referenced provision of the Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, remains silent on how to infuse life on an arbitral proceeding where the parties cannot possibly agree on a forum.
110
See, Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(3). (“Si après une
période de trois mois à compter de la notification de la prétention aucun accord
n’est intervenu sur l’une des procedures susmentionnées, le différend sera soumis,
101
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D. The Fork in the Road
Only a handful of Cuban BITs require the foreign investor to
exhaust local remedies before submitting the claim to international
arbitration. Article VI(2) of the Cuba-Turkey BIT, for instance,
grants the foreign investor standing to submit the dispute to the ICC
or to an ad hoc international arbitral tribunal under the UNCITRAL
arbitration rules “provided that the investor concerned has brought
the dispute before the courts of justice of the Party that is a party to
the dispute and a final award has not been rendered within one
year.”111 All to the contrary, however, under its treaties with Austria
and Chile, Cuba explicitly renounces “the requirement that the internal administrative or judicial remedies should be exhausted.”112
The uneasy cohabitation of the international and domestic legal
orders, so present in investment treaty arbitration, comes to light rather prominently in the fork-in-the-road provisions of Cuba’s BITs.
Although not universally adopted throughout the vast universe of
Cuba’s investment treaties, the latter’s agreements with Portugal,113

à la demande écrite de l’investisseur en cause, à l’arbitrage selon les Régles d’arbitrage de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international en vigueur.”).
111
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(2).
112
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 12(2); See also Cuba-Chile BIT,
supra note 58, at art. 8(2)(c). (“[L]as partes renuncian a exigir el agotamiento de
recursos judiciales internos.”).
113
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art.9(3) (“Uma vez submetido o diferendo a um dos procedimentos referidos no número anterior, a selecção será
definitiva.”).
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Bolivia,114 Peru,115 Venezuela,116 Guatemala,117 Chile,118 and Argentina,119 among others, do contain explicit fork-in-the-road
clauses. The linguistic structure of the typical Cuban fork-in-theroad provision, as reproduced in Article 9(2) of the Cuba-Argentina
BIT, stands as follows:
Once an investor has submitted the dispute either to
the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party involved or
to international arbitration, the choice of one or the
other of these procedures shall be final.120
Admittedly, the effectiveness of these fork-in-the-road clauses
will depend on whether the international arbitral tribunal is persuaded that the claims and parties present before the Cuban domestic
court are identical to those before it.121 Otherwise, the foreign inves114

Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(3) (“Una vez que el inversionista haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante
en cuyo territorio se hubiese efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral, la elección de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”).
115
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art.8(3) (“Una vez que se haya sometido
la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se
hubiera efectuado la inversión o al arbitraje internacional, bajo alguno de los foros
indicados, la elección de tal procedimiento será definitiva.”).
116
Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 9(2) (“El inversor que haya
optado por someter la controversia a los tribunales de la Parte Contratante, no
podrá luego recurrir al arbitraje.”).
117
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(3) (“Una vez que el inversionista haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se hubiera efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral,
la elección de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”).
118
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(3) (“Una vez que el inversionista
haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante en
cuyo territorio se hubiera efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral, la elección
de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”).
119
Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(2) (“Una vez que un inversor
haya sometido la controversia a las jurisdicciones de la Parte Contratante implicada o al arbitraje internacional, la elección de uno u otro de esos procedimientos
será definitiva.”).
120
Id.
121
In the words of Professor Jan Paulsson, “[t]he key is to assess whether the
same dispute has been submitted to both the national and international fora.” Pantechniki S.A. Contractors and Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 61 (July 30, 2009). For arbitral authority finding no identity
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tor will be allowed to elevate the dispute against Cuba to the international plane —even after having appeared before the local
court.122
E. Choice of Law
In similar fashion to the fork-in-the-road problématique, another
issue that brings to the surface the natural tension between the international and domestic legal systems is the choice of law question.
More often than not, the run-of-the-mill foreign investment project
in Cuba (or elsewhere) will touch upon elements of local corporate,
tax, property, administrative, monetary, and even constitutional
law,123 while at the same time implicating issues arising under customary international law such as the rules of treaty interpretation.124
of claims and parties, in the context of the fork-in-the-road clauses of the U.S.Argentina and Oman-Yemen BITs respectively, see CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 80 (July 17, 2003) (“[A]s contractual claims are different from treaty
claims, even if there had been or there currently was a recourse to the local courts
for breach of contract, this would not have prevented submission of the treaty
claims to arbitration”) and Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/17, Award ¶ 138 (February 6, 2008) (“In sum, the settlement
of the Claimant’s contractual claims in the Yemeni Arbitration does not bar the
Arbitral Tribunal from having jurisdiction in the present case, since the claims
formulated by the Claimant here are capable of constituting violations of the BIT
if they are upheld.”)..
122
As Professors Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer have observed,
“[o]nly rarely did tribunals find that the fundamental basis of the claim before
them was the same as before the domestic courts.” Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 2d edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 267-268. Note that one of the very few arbitral authorities precluding the
submission of an international investment claim on the basis of a foreign investor’s transgression of a fork-in-the-road clause is the above-referenced Pantechniki v. Republic of Albania Award. (“Having made the election to seise the national jurisdiction the Claimant is no longer permitted to raise the same contention
before ICSID.”) Pantechniki, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21 at ¶ 67.
123
Note that issues as consequential as what constitutes a “protected investment” and who is a “protected investor” under Cuba’s BITs is left, almost universally, to the dictates of Cuban domestic law. Wayne Sachs, The New U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 192, 203 (1984).
124
Note that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the rules
of treaty interpretation found in customary international law. See, for instance,
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America NAFTA, 14 44 I.L.M. 1345,
Final Award, ¶ 29. (Aug. 3, 2005). See also CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech
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The complexities surrounding the interactions between these parallel legal orders clearly encapsulates the relevance of the choice of
law question all throughout the life of the investment treaty arbitration --- from the jurisdictional stage all the way to the liability and
remedies’ phases of the dispute settlement proceeding.
Cuba’s BITs, however, offer no standard blueprint with respect
to the choice of law formulation. A fairly significant number of Cuban investment treaties, for instance, fail to include a choice of law
clause designating the substantive law governing the arbitral procedure. In those cases where Cuba and the other contracting party to
the bilateral investment treaty have remained silent as to the choice
of law selection while consenting to the jurisdiction of the ICC or to
the use of the arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL, the answer to the
choice of law inquiry is to be found in Articles 21 and 35 of the
ICC’s and the UNCITRAL rules, respectively; both of which establish that in the absence of an explicit choice of law designation “the
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appropriate.”125
Interestingly, under Article 22 of the widely used rules of the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(“SCC”) and Article 22.3 of the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) the result would be the same, since
pursuant to both provisions the arbitral tribunal enjoys ample authority to, in the absence of a designation by the parties, apply “the
law(s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate.”126
Along similar lines, a tribunal presiding an investment treaty arbitration involving Cuba under the Additional Facility Rules must,
in the absence of an explicit choice of law clause, apply “the law

Republic, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion on the Issue at the Quantum, ¶¶ 15-16
(Mar. 14, 2003).
125
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 35 (2010). Article 21 of the ICC Rules
uses almost identical language: “In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral
tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.” For
in-depth analysis of these two provisions See, e.g., SCHÜTZE, INSTITUTIONAL
ARBITRATION 109-14, 1209-118 (Munich: C.H. Beck, Rolf ed. 2013).
126
LCIA Arbitration Rules art. 22.3 (1998). Article 22 of the SCC Rules
equally establishes that in the absence of a choice of law clause, the arbitral tribunal shall apply “the law or rules of law, whichever it considers to be most appropriate.” See also SCHÜTZE, supra note 118, at 473-74, 835-37.

2017]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

27

determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable and such rules of international law as the Tribunal considers applicable.”127
In the context of a purely ad hoc investment arbitration, devoid
of any institutional trappings where the contracting parties have
failed to select the dispute’s governing law, the choice of law determination would squarely befall on the arbitral tribunal as a derivation of its inherent adjudicative authority.
Cuba’s investment treaties with, for instance, Mexico,128 Austria,129 Lebanon,130 and Greece131 stand for the opposite approach.
Each of these treaties contains an explicit choice of law provision
designating, almost invariably, the relevant BIT together with the
“applicable rules and principles of international law” as the governing law of any dispute arising between Cuba and an investor of the
other contracting party to the agreement.

127

ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 54, (Apr. 10, 2016), available at
https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_II/CMS%20GtA_Vol%20
II_3_11_ICSID%20Additional%20Facility%20Rules.pdf. Note that Article 42(1)
of the ICSID Convention mirrors this language: “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such
rules of international law as may be applicable.”)
128
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at app. 4 art. 7(1) (“Cualquier tribunal
establecido conforme a este Apéndice decidirá las controversias que se sometan
a su consideración de conformidad con las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, a
las reglas aplicables y a los principios del Derecho Internacional.”).
129
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 15(1) (“A tribunal established under this Part shall decide the dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules and principles of international law.”).
130
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(3) (“The arbitral tribunal shall
decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the
applicable rules and principles of international law.”).
131
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(4) (“The arbitral tribunal shall
decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the
applicable rules and principles of international law.”).
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Cuba’s BIT’s with Argentina,132 Spain,133 and China,134 moreover, incorporate an additional feature to their respective choice of
law provisions, and that is a renvoi clause135 affording the arbitral
tribunal sufficient flexibility to import legal constructs from other
legal systems by applying Cuba’s own conflict of laws rules.136
Although the vast majority of Cuban BITs establish no hierarchical or pyramidal order in the application of either domestic or
international law,137 it is safe to conclude that international law
132

Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(4) (“El órgano arbitral decidirá en base a las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, al derecho de la Parte Contratante que sea parte en la controversia, incluidas las normas relativas a conflictos
de leyes, a los términos de eventuales acuerdos particulares concluidos con relación a la inversión, como así también a los principios del derecho internacional
en la materia.”).
133
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(3) (“The decisions of the arbitral
tribunal shall be based on: The provisions of this Agreement and those of other
agreements between the Contracting Parties; The widely accepted norms and principles of international law; The domestic legislation of the Contracting Party in
whose territory the investment was made, including the rules on conflicts of
law.”).
134
Cuba-China BIT art. 9(7) (“The tribunal shall adjudicate in accordance
with the law of the Contracting Party to the dispute accepting the investment including its rules on the conflict of laws, the provisions of this Agreement as well
as the generally recognized principles of international law accepted by both Contracting Parties.”). Note that this is the language used in the old generation CubaChina BIT, signed on April 24, 1995 and renegotiated in 2007. For an analysis of
China’s old generation BITs see, e.g., , Ko-Yung Tung and Rafael Cox Alomar,
The New Generation of China BITs in light of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru,
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461 (2007).
135
Note that Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention also includes a renvoi
clause. For relevant commentary see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 601-02 (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
136
For an illuminating treatise, in 2 volumes, on Cuban private international
law refer to Rodolfo Dávalos Fernández, Derecho Internacional Privado: Parte
General (La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela, 2006) and Rodolfo Dávalos Fernández, Taydit Peña Lorenzo and María del Carmen Santibáñez Freire, Derecho Internacional Privado: Parte Especial (La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela, 2007).
While deserving careful and thoughtful analysis in a separate writing, it is worth
pointing out that the rules of Cuban private international law amount to a complex,
and rather asymmetrical, web of positive law provisions found for the most part
in the so-called Bustamante Code (1928) and the Cuban Civil Code.
137
On the absence of a choice of law hierarchy , see the observations made by
the arbitral tribunals in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 400 (Mar. 14, 2003) (“The Tribunal’s analysis is that
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would govern the overwhelming majority of investment treaty arbitrations involving Cuba.
F. Remedies
It is well settled that arbitral tribunals do possess inherent authority to award both pecuniary and non-pecuniary remedies,138 including restitutionary,139 declaratory,140 injunctive, and interim relief.141 This notwithstanding, a number of Cuban BITs limit the ar-

the application of the four sources of law as provided for in art. 8 (6) of the [Netherlands-Czech Republic] Treaty have no ranking according to the wording of the
Treaty.”); National Grid, P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 82
(November 3, 2008) (“This provision points to the application of the Treaty itself,
Argentine law including its rules on conflict of laws), and “the applicable principles of international law.” Although the Parties do not disagree that these are the
relevant sources of law applicable to this dispute, they note the absence of specific
guidelines under the Treaty as to which aspect of the dispute is governed by one
source or the other and how those sources interact in case of conflict inter se.”
138
See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. et. al v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1, ¶ 32 (Award, July 25, 2007) (“Reparation can thus take the form
of restitution or compensation.”) Article 34 of the Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) establishes that “[f]ull reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of
restitution, compensation and satisfaction either singly or in combination [ . . . ]”),
available in Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 2 (New York:
United Nations, 2001), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks
/english/ilc_2001_v2_p2.pdf.
139
See Von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15,
Award, ¶ 700 (July 28, 2015) (“[I]t is beyond doubt that non-pecuniary remedies,
including restitution, can be awarded in ICSID Convention arbitrations under investment treaties.”). The same maxim applies to investment treaty arbitrations involving Cuban BIT’s even without the ICSID radius.
140
See Quiborax S.A. and Non Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Plurinational State
of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, ¶ 560 (Sept. 16, 2015) (“The fact
that some types of satisfaction are not available does not mean that the Tribunal
cannot make a declaratory judgment as a means of satisfaction under Article 37
of the ILC Articles, if appropriate. Moreover, this is also a power inherent to the
Tribunal’s mandate to resolve the dispute.”).
141
See Paushok et. al. v. Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Order on
Interim Measures, ¶ 45 (Sept. 2, 2008) (“It is internationally recognized that five
standards have to be met before a tribunal will issue an order in support of interim
measures. They are (1) prima facie jurisdiction, (2) prima facie establishment of
the case, (3) urgency, (4) imminent danger of serious prejudice (necessity) and (5)
proportionality.”) Of singular importance in the Cuban context are UNCITRAL’s

30

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

bitral tribunal’s remedial authority to the rendering of money damages. Both the old Cuba-China BIT142 and, more importantly, the
Cuba-Venezuela BIT143 explicitly limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction to
the assessment of pecuniary remedies. Yet, such limitation is rendered useless, for instance, within the context of an illegal expropriation claim --- where under the so-called Chorzów rule, the standard
of compensation is to be found not in the lex specialis (i.e. the applicable Cuban BIT), but rather in customary international law.144
Similarly, while most Cuban BITs remain silent as to the nature
of the remedies available under them,145 there is an overwhelming
consensus in international arbitral authority to the effect that “the
right to compensation for breaches of international law follows from
general principles of international law as supplemented by general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”146 Thus, in the
event an international arbitral tribunal finds Cuba in violation of its
obligations under an investment treaty, the arbitrators would possess
ample authority to articulate an award consisting of both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary remedies, even in the face of a silent BIT.
Admittedly, complex issues of sovereign immunity and international comity will make non-pecuniary remedies utterly impractical

Article 26, ICC’s Article 28, LCIA’s Article 25 and SCC’s Article 32 on interim
and conservatory measures.
142
See Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 9(3) (renegotiated in 2007),
which limited China’s and Cuba’s consent to international arbitration only for the
purpose of determining “the amount of compensation for expropriation.”
143
See Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 9(4) (La jurisdicción del
tribunal arbitral se limitará a determinar si la Parte Contratante de que se trate ha
incumplido [ . . . ] y si tal incumplimiento ha ocurrido y ha causado daños al inversor, a fijar la suma que deberá pagar la Parte Contratante al inversor como
indemnización de tales daños.”).
144
Rafael Cox Alomar, “Compensation in the Context of Unlawful Expropriations,” in IAN A. LAIRD, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (New York: Juris, 2016).
145
It is worth noting, however, that Article 16(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT
explicitly establishes that declaratory and restitutionary relief is available under
the treaty. Similarly, Articles V(3) and VI(1) of the Cuba-Spain BIT also provide
for restitutionary relief both in the context of a claim for expropriation or for losses
resulting from war, armed conflict and states of emergency.
146
SwemBalt AB, Sweden v. Republic of Latvia, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 38
(Oct. 23, 2000).
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or unviable under certain circumstances.147 However, there is no
bright line rule in customary international law precluding an international arbitral tribunal from awarding non-pecuniary relief to an
aggrieved foreign investor if the factual and legal realities surrounding the claim warrant it.148 The opposite is true of punitive damages
against a sovereign state, which are unavailable as a matter of customary international law.149
The rendering of the award, once the remedies stage of the arbitral proceeding has concluded, leads the foreign investor to the more
momentous phase of recognition and enforcement of the tribunal’s
decision.
G. Recognition and Enforcement
Cuba’s BITs refer the party seeking recognition and enforcement to the domestic legal order of the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. The language used in the recognition and enforcement clauses of Cuba’s BITs is not identical. While most Cuban
BITs explicitly refer the moving party to the “domestic” or “national” law of the jurisdiction where recognition and enforcement is

147
Note, for instance, that Article 54 of the ICSID Convention only mandates
the enforcement of “the pecuniary obligations imposed by [the] award as if it were
a final judgment of a court in that State.” Thus, non-pecuniary awards are left out
of the self-contained enforcement mechanism available under the ICSID Convention in no small measure due to issues of sovereign immunity and international
comity. ICSID Convention, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
148
Rafael Cox Alomar, “Compensation in the Context of Unlawful Expropriations,” The Journal of Damages in International Arbitration, available at
https://arbitrationlaw.com/library/compensation-context-unlawful-expropriations-journal-damages-international-arbitration-vol-3.
149
See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
art. 37(3) and in particular Commentary 8 to the text adopted by the International
Law Commission, which appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 2001). See also Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra
note 62, at art. 8(4) explicitly forbids the rendering of punitive damages. Of interest is the fact that NAFTA also expressly precludes tribunals from awarding punitive damages. See NAFTA’s Chapter 11, Article 1135(3).
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sought,150 some merely reiterate that the award “shall be final and
binding,”151 while other agreements simply remain silent.152
Despite the dissimilar language, the procedural route for recognition and enforcement under all Cuban investment treaties leads to
the domestic legal plane. The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Cuba is governed by Articles 483, 484, and
485 of the Law of Civil, Administrative, and Labor Procedure (Ley
de Procedimiento Civil, Administrativo, y Laboral),153 as well as by
the strictures of the New York Convention—which has been in full
force and effect on Cuban soil since March 30, 1975.154
Article 483 of the Cuban statute provides for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards meeting the following criteria: firstly, the underlying legal action must have been presented in
personam; secondly, the arbitral award must have been rendered in
the ordinary course not in default (rebeldía); thirdly, the obligations
requiring performance under the award must be legal in nature per
the applicable Cuban legislation; fourthly, the award, together with
all other accompanying documents, must be authenticated according
to the laws of the jurisdiction where it was made; fifthly, in the event
150

See, inter alia, Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(3); Cuba-Chile
BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(5); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(3);
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(4); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note
61, at art. IX(5); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(4); Cuba-Peru BIT,
supra note 77, at art. 8(4); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11(2); CubaLebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(3); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art.
10(4); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, art. 9(5); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note
64, at art. XI(4).
151
See, inter alia, Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2)(b); CubaSlovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at
art. 9(5); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(3).
152
See, inter alia, Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10; Cuba-Italy BIT,
supra note 70, at art. 9; Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10; CubaRomania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9; Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64,
at art. 8; Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8.
153
Refer to Dávalos Fernández, Taydit Peña Lorenzo and María del Carmen
Santibáñez Freire, Derecho Internacional Privado: Parte Especial, LA HABANA,
260 (2007) (Cuba). Note, moreover, that the Ley de Procedimiento Civil, Administrativo y Laboral was enacted by the National Assembly of People’s Power during the ordinary session taking place on July 12-14, 1977.
154
United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (the “New
York Convention”).
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the award was issued in a non-contracting state to the New York
Convention, it must also come with a declaration from the ministry
of foreign affairs of the country of origin, certifying that an award
rendered in Cuba would also be afforded recognition and enforcement therein on a reciprocal basis;155 and sixthly, the moving party
must identify with particularity the Cuban domicile of the person
(natural or juridical) against whom recognition and enforcement is
sought.156
Article 484, moreover, designates the Cuban Supreme Court as
the forum where the petition for recognition and enforcement must
be presented, unless an international treaty ratified by Cuba provides
otherwise.157 The petition, moreover, along with its Spanish translation, shall be served on the person (natural or juridical) against
whom recognition and enforcement is sought.158 The Cuban Supreme Court shall hear the respondent within 10 days from the service of notice, at which point the Court will either grant or deny the
petition without the possibility of further review.159
The Cuban statute, however, must be read in tandem with the
New York Convention. It is well settled that non-ICSID investment
arbitration awards against Cuba or its instrumentalities fall under the
scope of the New York Convention,160 and, hence, are susceptible

155

Note that in acceding to the New York Convention, Cuba made the reservation that with respect to non-contracting parties it would only enforce the Convention on the basis of reciprocity. New York Arbitration Convention, available
at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
156
See LEY DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIVO Y
LABORAL art. 483 (Cuba).
157
See Id., at art. 484 (Cuba).
158
Id.
159
Id., at art. 485 (Cuba).
160
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 13 provides, in part, that
“[c]laims submitted to arbitration under this Part shall be considered to arise out
of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of Article 1 of the New
York Convention.” Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 9(5) mirrors this language, “Para los efectos del Artículo 1 de la Convención de Nueva York, se considerará que la reclamación que se somete a arbitraje conforme a este Apéndice,
surge de una relación u operación comercial.” For a robust analysis showing that
sovereign states and public entities fall under the New York Convention’s rubric
of “persons,” see REINMAR WOLFF, NEW YORK CONVENTION, 69-70 (Munich:
C.H. Beck, 2012).
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to challenge on the basis of the various escape hatches provided under Article V of the Convention.161
H. The MFN Clause
A most relevant feature of a growing number of Cuban BITs is
the expansive reach of their most-favored-nation (“MFN”) provisions. Under Cuba’s bilateral investment treaties with, for instance,
the United Kingdom,162 Germany,163 Slovakia,164 Barbados,165
Peru,166 Bolivia,167 and Turkey,168 the language of the MFN clause
explicitly suggests that MFN treatment extends to dispute settlement; which means that “if a third-party treaty contains provisions
for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic
treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the
most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the
ejusdem generis principle.”169
This notwithstanding, most Cuban MFN provisions remain silent as to their applicability to dispute settlement. Thus, it would

161

Besides challenges on the basis of sovereign immunity, lack of arbitrability, procedural due process and public policy, non-moving parties have often challenged recognition and enforcement when the arbitral award has been set aside by
a court in the jurisdiction where the award was made. See, e.g., Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex, 832 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2016), where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
U.S. District Court for the District of New York’s recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award rendered in Mexico against Pemex despite the fact that a Mexican court had vacated it. See generally, Radu Lelutiu, Managing Requests for Enforcement of Vacated Awards under the New York Convention, 14 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 345 (2003).
162
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 3(3).
163
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 3(5).
164
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 3(3).
165
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 3(3).
166
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 3(6).
167
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. III(2).
168
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. II(3).
169
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5
ICSID Rep. 396 (2002).
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typically befall on the arbitral tribunal to decide whether to read into
the MFN clause the inclusion of dispute settlement.170
IV. STANDARDS OF PROTECTION UNDER CUBA’S BITS
A. Protected Foreign Investment
Substantively, Cuba’s BITs offer the foreign investor the typical
assortment of legal protections and safeguards available in most international investment treaties. More specifically, Cuban BITs almost universally provide overly broad definitions of what constitutes a “protected investment” under the applicable investment
agreement. Article 1(a) of the Cuba-Barbados BIT, for instance, establishes that:
For purposes of this Agreement:
(a) ‘investment’ means every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:
(i) movable and immovable property and any
other property rights such as mortgages, liens or
pledges;

170
Note that far from homogenous, arbitral tribunals have shown themselves
in disagreement as to whether a silent MFN provision should be read as expansively as to allow the bypassing of the basic treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism. See ,Sanum Inv. Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
PSA Case No. 2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 358 (Dec. 13, 2013), (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2013). (“[T]o read into that clause a dispute settlement provision to cover all
protections under the Treaty when the Treaty itself provides for very limited access to international arbitration would result in a substantial re-write of the Treaty
and an extension of the State Parties’ consent to arbitration beyond what may be
assumed to have been their intention.”) Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 167 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C39/D
C1492_En.pdf. (“Ordinarily, an MFN Clause would not operate so as to replace
one means of dispute settlement with another . . . the prospect of an investor selecting at will from an assorted variety of options provided in other treaties negotiated with other parties under different circumstances, dislodges the dispute resolution provision in the basic treaty itself.”).
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(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a
company;
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value;
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how;
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for,
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.171
The language of the Cuba-Barbados BIT, premised on an expansive asset-based concept of what amounts to a “protected investment” under the treaty, is also present in Cuba’s BITs with, for instance, the United Kingdom,172 Slovakia,173 Germany,174 Peru,175
Bolivia,176 Turkey,177 Austria,178 Mexico,179 Indonesia,180 Vietnam,181 Romania,182 France,183 Hungary,184 Greece,185 Lebanon,186 the Netherlands,187 Spain,188 and China.189 In construing the

171
172

Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(a).
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(a) (“every kind of as-

set”).
173

Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”).
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art.1(1) (“toda clase de bienes”).
175
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 1(1) (“toda clase de activos”).
176
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. I(1) (“toda clase de bienes o derechos relacionados”).
177
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of asset.”).
178
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of asset”).
179
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 1 (“cualquier tipo de activo”).
180
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“any kind of asset”).
181
Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“any kind of assets”).
182
Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of assets”).
183
Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(1) (“tous les avoirs”).
184
Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”).
185
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”).
186
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of assets”).
187
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(a) (“every kind of asset”).
188
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2) (“any kind of assets”).
189
Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”).
174
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definition of “protected investment” under a Cuban BIT, an international arbitral tribunal ought to look, not at the strictures of Cuban
domestic law, but rather at international law.190
It is well settled, moreover, that an investment fraught by illegality does not qualify for protection under any Cuban BIT.191 Unsurprisingly, a significant number of Cuban BITs explicitly limit the
treaty’s protection only to those foreign investments made “in conformity with” the laws of Cuba and those of the other contracting
state to the investment treaty.192
190

Refer, for instance, to République D’Italie v. République de Cuba, Arbitrage Ad’Hoc, Sentence Preliminaire, ¶¶ 80-81 (Mar. 15, 2005) (“Les dispositions
de cette loi ne peuvent être utilisées pour définir la notion d’investissement au
sens de l’Accord. [ . . . ] [l]a notion d’investissement ne doit pas pouvoir varier et
fluctuer en fonction des législations nationales de chacun d’entre eux et de leurs
évolutions respectives. [ . . . ] Il appartient donc au Tribunal Arbitral de rechercher
dans la jurisprudence internationale et dans la doctrine une définition de la notion
d’investissement compatible avec les dispositions de l’Accord, son objet et ses
objectifs.”). See also, Saipem S.P.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 82 (Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]he Tribunal cannot depart from the
general rule that treaties are to be interpreted by reference to international law. It
is thus not prepared to consider that the term “investment” in Article 1(1) of the
BIT is defined according to the law of the host State.”). See id. at ¶ 120 (“Accordingly, the question is whether Saipem made an investment within the meaning of
Article 1(1) of the [Bangladesh-Italy] BIT, without reference to the law of Bangladesh.”).
191
The ancient legal principle of ex delicto non oritur actio (“an unlawful act
cannot serve as the basis of an action in law”) has been widely incorporated to
international investment law. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). See Fraport AG Frankfurt
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/12, Award, ¶ 332 (Dec. 10, 2014) (“As other tribunals have recognized,
there is an increasingly well-established international principle which makes international legal remedies unavailable with respect to illegal investments, at least
when such illegality goes to the essence of the investment.”). See also Oxus Gold
v. Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 706 (Dec. 17, 2015), available
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf
(“The Arbitral Tribunal agrees . . . that an investment may not qualify for protection under a BIT, where such investment was made in breach of relevant laws and
regulations, including international treaties but also national law of the host
State.”).
192
See Cuba-Venezuela. BIT, supra note 66, at art. (2)(e) (“y otros derechos
otorgados conforme al Derecho Público”); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at
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B. Protected Foreign Investor
Under Cuban BITs, a “protected foreign investor” is defined as
a natural or legal person having the nationality of one of the contracting states entering into the BIT.193 Standing, thus, is conditioned to whether the natural or legal persons raising the claim meet
the nationality requirements of the specific BIT under which protection is sought.
In order to enjoy standing to sue Cuba under most Cuban BITs,
the foreign investor, if a natural person, must be a national of the
other contracting state to the BIT--- as defined by the latter’s nationality laws.194 If a legal person, it must have been constituted in
art. 1(1)(f) (“in conformity with its laws and regulations”); Cuba-Lebanon BIT,
supra note 60, at art. 1(2)(d) (“in accordance with the law”); Cuba-Austria BIT,
supra note 57, at art. 2(1) (“according to its laws and regulations”); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art.1(2) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations
of the latter”); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. 1(2) I(2) (“in conformity
with the hosting Party’s laws and regulations”); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note
59, at art. 1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations of the latter”); CubaArgentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 1(1) (“de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentaciones de la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art.
1(1) (“in conformità delle leggi e dei regolamenti di quest’ultima”); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. I(2) (“de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos
de la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(1) (“in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the latter”); Cuba-China BIT, supra
note 134, at art. 1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations”); Cuba-Chile
BIT, supra note 58, at art. 1(2) (“de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos de
la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“pursuant
to the laws and regulations in force”); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art.
1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations”); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra
note 61, at art. I(1) (“efectuado de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos”);
Cuba-Portugal BIT supra note 63, at art. I(1) (“nos termos da respectiva legislação
aplicável sobre a matéria”); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2) (“acquired
in accordance with the legislation of the country in which the investment is
made.”).
193
Clearly, a Cuban national or legal person has no standing to sue Cuba under
any bilateral investment treaty. Note that “[i]nvestment treaties confer rights to
foreign investors, which are unavailable to nationals of the host country. Legitimate policy reasons justify this differential treatment.” See Gallo v.Government
of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award, ¶ 331 (Sept. 15, 2011) available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0351_0.pdf.
194
Note that with respect to Cuban investors doing business in the territory of
the other contracting party to the BIT (besides Cuba) some Cuban BITs require
both Cuban nationality and permanent domicile in Cuba for protection under the
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accordance with the laws of the other contracting state to the BIT.195
Under most Cuban BITs, however, a foreign legal person’s standing
to bring a claim against Cuba will depend on its compliance with
additional treaty specific requirements.
Besides incorporation in accordance with the laws of the other
contracting state to the bilateral investment treaty, foreign legal persons seeking protection under Cuba’s BITs with, for instance, Turkey,196 Spain,197 Portugal,198 and Lebanon,199 must also have their
“headquarters,” “main office,” “sede,” or “seat” in either Turkish,
Spanish, Portuguese, or Lebanese territory. Comparatively, under
Cuba’s BITs with Bolivia,200 Mexico,201 Chile,202 Romania,203 and
Guatemala,204 the standing of a foreign legal person raising a claim
against Cuba depends not just on the place of incorporation and the
geographic location of its corporate seat, but also on whether that
corporate entity conducts significant business in Bolivian, Mexican,
Chilean, Romanian, or Guatemalan territory.

bilateral investment treaty. See e.g., Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 1(1);
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 1; Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61,
at art. 1(1); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(b)..
195
See e.g., Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 1(3); Cuba-Barbados BIT,
supra note 64, at art 1(d); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(d);
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57
at art.1(1).
196
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. I(1)(b) (“[ . . . ] and having their
headquarters in the territory of that Party”).
197
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(1)(b) (“[ . . . ] and having their
main office in the territory of that Contracting Party”).
198
Cuba-Portugal BIT supra note 63, at art. 1(3) (“que tenham sede no território de uma das Partes Contratantes.”).
199
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 1(1)(b) (“have their seat in the
territory of that same Contracting Party.”).
200
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art.I(2)(b) (“asimismo como sus actividades económicas sustanciales en el territorio de dicha Parte contratante.”).
201
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art.1) (“que desempeñe actividades
económicas o comerciales en el mismo.”)
202
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 1(1) (b) (“así como sus actividades
económicas efectivas.”).
203
Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 1(1)(b) (“together with real economic activities in the territory of that same Contracting Party.”).
204
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. (1)(b) (“así como sus actividades económicas efectivas, en el territorio de dicha Parte Contratante.”).
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Interestingly, under Cuba’s BITs with France,205 Switzerland,206
the Netherlands,207 and Venezuela,208 the place of incorporation, the
location of the corporate seat, or even the significance of the legal
person’s entrepreneurial presence in French, Swiss, Dutch, or Venezuelan territory is not dispositive of the standing question. Rather,
direct or indirect control at the hands of a French, Swiss, Dutch, or
Venezuelan natural or legal person is sufficient to render standing
to a company doing business in Cuba with no substantive legal connection to France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, or Venezuela.
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment
The Cuban Republic, moreover, extends to all foreign investments made in the island, under the aegis of a Cuban BIT, fair and
equitable treatment protection. Article IV(1) of the Cuba-Spain BIT,
for example, provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall guarantee
fair and equitable treatment in its territory for investments made by
investors of the other Contracting Party.”209 Despite the obvious absence of consensus among international arbitral tribunals on the exact content of the fair and equitable treatment protection,210 it is universally agreed that “conduct that is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust
205

Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(3) (“ou contrôlée directement ou
indirectement par des nationaux de l’une des Parties contractantes, ou par des personnes morales possédant leur siège social sur le territoire de l’une des Parties
contractantes et constituées conformément à la législation de celle-ci.”).
206
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, art. 1(1)(c) (“lorsque plus de 50 pour
cent de son capital social appartient en pleine proprieté à des personnes de cette
Partie Contractante; ou lorsque des personnes de cette Partie Contractante ont la
capacité de nommer une majorité de ses administrateurs, ou sont autrement habilitées en droit à diriger ses opérations.”).
207
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(b) (“[ . . . ] legal persons
not constituted under the law of that Contracting Party but controlled, directly or
indirectly, by natural persons as defined in (i) or by legal persons as defined in (ii)
above.”).
208
Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 1(1)(b) (“o efectivamente controlada por inversores de esa Parte Contratante.”).
209
See Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. IV(1).
210
See e.g., Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, May 22, 2007, ¶ 256 (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf
(“The Tribunal notes that the Respondent is right in arguing that fair and equitable
treatment is a standard none too clear and precise. This is because international
law is not too clear and precise either on the treatment due to foreign citizens,
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or idiosyncratic or that ‘involves a lack of due process leading to an
outcome which offends judicial propriety’”211 runs counter to the
fair and equitable protection arising under Cuba’s BITs.
D. Full Protection and Security
In a significant number of Cuban BITs, the fair and equitable
treatment protection is accompanied by yet another substantive safeguard, namely the so-called full protection and security standard.212
Article 3(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT, for instance, establishes that
“[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments by investors
of the other Contracting Party . . . full and constant protection and
security.”213 Contrary to the fair and equitable treatment safeguard,
the full protection and security standard is far more specific, and less
abstract, than the former one.214 Under the full protection and security standard, Cuba is, thus, bound by treaty to adopt all necessary
traders and investors or with respect to the fact that the pertinent standards have
gradually evolved over the centuries. Customary international law, treaties of
friendship, commerce and navigation, and more recently bilateral investment treaties, have all contributed to this development.”).
211
Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on
Liability, December 27, 2010, ¶ 110 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0868.pdf.
212
In the following Cuban BIT’s, the fair and equitable treatment clause and
the full protection and security provision appear side by side, in the same section
of the treaty (this list is non-exhaustive): Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at
art.3(1); Cuba-Slovakia. BIT, supra note 59, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 3(1); CubaBarbados BIT, supra note 64, at art 2(2); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note
64, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. II(2); Cuba-Greece
BIT, supra note 55, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 4(1);
Cuba-Switzerland.BIT, supra note 69, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra
note 54, at art. 3(1); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 3(1); Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art.
3(1). In Cuba’s BIT’s with France and the Netherlands, the full protection and
security clauses appear under the section on expropriation. See Cuba-France BIT,
supra note 68, at art. 5(1) (“Les investissements effectués . . . bénéficient . . .
d’une protection et d’une sécurité pleines et entières.”), and Cuba-Italy BIT, supra
note 70, at art. 5(1) (“Gli investimenti di capitali degli investitore di una delle
Parti Contraenti godranno di piena protezione e sicurezza nel territorio
dell’altra.”).
213
See Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art.3(1).
214
Note that there appears to be a dissonance among international arbitral tribunals on whether the full protection and security standard, besides the physical
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measures to defend the physical integrity of the foreign investment
from aggression.215
E. Force Majeure
Along similar lines, Cuba’s BITs almost invariably include a
force majeure clause. The typical force majeure provision reads as
follows:
Investors of one Contracting Party, whose investments in the territory of the other Contracting Party
suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, a
state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or
riot in the territory of the latter Contracting Party,
shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party
treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification,
compensation or other settlement. The treatment
shall not be less favourable than that which the latter
Contracting Party accords to its own investors or investors of any third state, whichever is more favourable to the investors concerned. Payments shall be
made without delay and in the freely convertible currencies agreed upon by the parties.216

integrity, also extends to the stability of the legal superstructure applicable to the
foreign investment. See BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award,
Dec. 24, 2007, ¶ 326 (Dec. 24, 2007), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf (“The Tribunal is mindful that other tribunals have found that the standard of ‘protection and constant security’ encompasses stability of the legal framework applicable to the investment. [ . . . ] However . . . the Tribunal finds it inappropriate to depart from the originally understood standard of ‘protection and constant security.’”).
215
Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 484 (Mar.
17, 2006), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0740.pdf (“[ . . . ] is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an investor’s investment, but to protect more specifically the physical integrity of an
investment against interference by use of force.”).
216
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. V.
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Almost identical force majeure language is found in Cuba’s
BITs with, for instance, the Netherlands,217 Argentina, 218 Lebanon,219 Spain,220 France,221 Portugal,222 Germany,223 Italy,224
Peru,225 Bolivia,226 Chile,227 Vietnam,228 Guatemala,229 and Turkey.230 A significant number of Cuban BITs provide investors an
additional layer of protection under their respective force majeure
clauses. More specifically, under its bilateral investment treaties
with the United Kingdom,231 Switzerland,232 Austria,233 Greece,234
Barbados,235 Hungary,236 and Slovakia,237 the Cuban Republic has
explicitly agreed to offer foreign investors from these jurisdictions
outright restitution or monetary compensation where the requisition
or destruction of their respective investments was perpetrated by
governmental forces, not in combat action and not required to so act
by the necessity of the situation.238 While not strictly liable for losses
under either the force majeure or protection and security standards,

217

Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 7.
Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art.4(2).
219
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art.4(4).
220
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. VI(1).
221
Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 5(3).
222
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 5.
223
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 4(3).
224
Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 4.
225
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 6.
226
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IV(4).
227
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 6(4).
228
Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4.
229
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VI(4).
230
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. III(3).
231
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4(2).
232
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 7(2).
233
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 6(2).
234
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 6(2).
235
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4(2).
236
Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 4(2).
237
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 4(2).
238
Refer to the arbitral tribunal’s construction of Article 4(2) of the Sri LankaUK BIT, which is both stylistically and substantively analogous to the above-referenced provisions, available in Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of
Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶¶ 57-64 (June 27, 1990),
6 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 526 (1991).
218
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Cuba bears, nonetheless, the legal duty of due diligence.239 Due diligence, in this context, means that Cuba must “adopt all reasonable
measures to protect assets and property from threats or attacks”240
to the extent “feasible and practicable under the circumstances.”241
F. Expropriation
Cuba’s BITs, furthermore, establish with uncharacteristic clarity
the framework for determining the legality or illegality of an expropriation. Article 5 of the Cuba-Greece BIT is emblematic of the traditional expropriation clause available in most Cuban treaties,
Investments by investors of either Contracting Party
in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall
not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any
other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or naturalization, except in
the public interest, under due process of law, on a
non discriminatory basis and against payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such
compensation shall amount to the market value of the
investment affected immediately before the actual
measure was taken or became public knowledge,
whichever is the earlier, [and] it shall include interest
from the date of expropriation until the date of payment . . . and shall be freely transferable in a . . .
convertible currency.242
Hence, absent a public purpose, due process of law, and payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation (defined as fair
market value as of the date of the taking) any expropriation or nationalization of a protected foreign investment at the hands of the
Cuban Republic would stand in violation of Cuba’s own BITs, thus,
making such action illegal under international law. In such case the
239

Saluka Investment BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶ 484 (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documen
ts/ita0740.pdf (“The host State is, however, obliged to exercise due diligence.”).
240
Id.
241
Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 183 (2d ed. 2012).
242
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 5.
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standard of compensation is found, not in the applicable Cuban BIT,
but rather in customary international law under the rubric of the
widely reputed Chorzów Factory rule.243 Of considerable significance is the fact that most Cuban BITs make no distinction between
direct and indirect expropriations.244 Both modalities of confiscation
stand on equal footing, subject to the same legal framework.245
243

Under the eponymous Chorzów Factory rule “reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” In so doing, international arbitral tribunals have been inclined to disaggregate the date of expropriation from the date of valuation for purposes of assessing compensation within the context of an illegal expropriation --- among
many other measures aimed at making the aggrieved party whole. See Factory at
Chorzów (Merits), PCIJ Rep. Ser. A (No. 17), 46-47 (1928). See also Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. AA227, Award on the Merits, ¶ 1765 (July 18, 2014), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3279.pdf (“[C]onflating the measure of damages for a lawful taking with the measure of damages for
an unlawful taking is, on its face, an unconvincing option.”).
244
Reference to indirect expropriation in Cuban BITs usually takes the form
of language along the following lines: “investments of nationals or companies of
either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to
measures having effect equivalent . . . “ See, e.g., Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 5(1); For treaties containing similar language see, Cuba-Greece
BIT, supra note 48, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. IV;
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note
61, at art. VI(1); Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Germany BIT,
supra note 77, at art. 4(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 4(1); CubaSpain BIT, supra note 64, at art. V(1); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art.
4(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 6(1); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 6(1); CubaHungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 5(1). Other treaties simply state that “[i]nvestment shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subject, directly or indirectly.” See
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. III(1); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57,
at art. 5(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 5(2); Cuba-France BIT, supra
note 68, at art. 5(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 7; Cuba-Romania
BIT, supra note 56, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 6(1); CubaBolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IV(1); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at
art. 5(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 4(2); Cuba-Netherlands BIT,
supra note 54, at art. 6.
245
For a definition of indirect expropriation refer, for instance, to Starrett
Housing Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 24, Interlocutory
Award No. ITL 32-24-1, December 19, 1983, reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. CTR 122,
154 (“[I]t is recognized in international law that the measures taken by a state can
interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so
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G. Transfer of Funds
The critical issue of revenue repatriation, so essential to the foreign investor’s short-term calculus, is amply addressed in Cuba’s
BITs. Cuban repatriation clauses identify with specificity a non-exhaustive list of protected transfers under the relevant treaty. Article
5 of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, for instance, establishes that permitted transfers, include, in particular, though not exclusively:
(i)
profits, interests, dividends and other current
income;
(ii)
funds necessary for the acquisition of raw or
auxiliary materials, semi-fabricated or finished products, or to replace capital assets in order to safeguard
the continuity of an investment;
(iii)
additional funds necessary for the development of an investment;
(iv)

funds in repayment of loans;

(v)

royalties or fees;

(vi)
earnings of expatriates working in connection
with an investment;
(vii) the proceeds of sale or liquidation of the investment; [and
(viii)

payments under the force majeure clause.246

Doctrinally, the litmus test for determining what constitutes a
permitted transfer necessarily entails an analysis of whether it is “es-

useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated.”); see also L.E.S.I.
SpA v. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/3, Award, ¶ 131 (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://icsidfiles.worl
dbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C48/DC890_Fr.pdf (“En droit international, l’expropriation ne se limite pas à la confiscation de biens matériels . . .
en certaines circonstances, résulter de la privation substantielle de droit contractuels. Ce type d’expropriation dite «indirecte» ou «rampante».”).
246
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 5(1).
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sential for, or typical to the making, controlling, maintenance, disposition”247 of the investment. The threshold question, thus, hinges
on whether the transfer is directly “related to the investment.”248
The foreign investor’s repatriation rights, however, are not without limits. In striking a delicate balance between Cuba’s (or the other
contracting state’s) “monetary sovereignty”249 and the foreign investors’ repatriation rights, Cuban treaties establish that transfers
shall be made in convertible currency pursuant to the laws and regulations of the contracting state where the investment was made.250
Arguably, little stands in the way of the Cuban Republic’s authority
under its various BIT’s to, for instance, modify exchange rate regulations and demand foreign investors get Central Bank authorization, ex ante, as a precondition for repatriation.251
This notwithstanding, Article VII(4) of the Cuba-Spain BIT explicitly limits the contracting states’ radius of action, mandating that
no more than three months elapse between the time the foreign investor submits the transfer application and the time when the transfer is actually made.252 Perhaps the Cuban-Peruvian repatriation
clause brings to the fore, more vividly than most, the absence of
247

Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 240 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
248
Id.
249
Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 213 (2d ed. 2012).
250
Emphasis added. See, e.g., Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 4(3);
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 6; Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra
note 64, at art. 6; Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. V(2); Cuba-Portugal
BIT, supra note 63, at art. 6(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 5(2);
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 5(2); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note
61, at art. V(2); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 5(2); Cuba-France BIT,
supra note 68, at art. 6; Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 6; Cuba-Indonesia
BIT, supra note 64, at art. VI(1); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 6(2);
Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 6(1).
251
Refer to Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award, ¶ 179 (June 6, 2008), available at http://ww
w.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0516.pdf (“The Tribunal concludes that Claimants, who knew the regulations on this matter well . . . did not
comply with the established procedure, which consisted of requesting authorization from the Central Bank . . . and that Argentina did not breach article 5(b) of
the BIT.”).
252
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. VII(4)
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treaty homogeneity as regards transferability. Under Article 4(5) of
the Cuba-Peru BIT,253 both contracting states have reserved their
right to temporarily limit transfers in the face of a deficient balance
of payments --- a prerogative not present in the text of the vast majority of Cuban BIT’s.
H. The Umbrella Clause
Such textual heterogeneity becomes even more accentuated with
respect to the so-called umbrella clause. As a threshold matter, it is
essential to note that not all Cuban BIT’s contain umbrella clauses.
Under those Cuban BITs without umbrella clauses, the question
of whether a purely contractual breach rises to the level of a treaty
breach --- thus constituting a transgression of international law --will depend on whether the foreign investor’s claim for breach of
the BIT’s substantive protections arose out of a contractual
breach.254 The above-referenced test appears to be inapplicable in
the face of the typical Cuban umbrella clause, whereby the Cuban
Republic is bound to observe any present or future legal obligation
with regard to the investments covered by the BIT. Article 7(2) of
the Cuba-Romania BIT is emblematic of the umbrella clause language adopted by the Cuban Republic in its treaties with the United
Kingdom,255 Germany,256 Austria,257 Lebanon,258 Greece,259 Venezuela,260 Switzerland,261 and Barbados.262

253
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 4(5)The original Spanish version of
this provision reads as follows, (“[C]ada Parte contratante tendrá derecho, en situaciones de dificultades excepcionales o graves de balanza de pagos, a limitar
temporalmente las transferencias, en forma equitativa y no discriminatoria, de
conformidad con los criterios internacionalmente aceptados.”).
254
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty –
The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 THE JOURNAL OF
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 556, 561 (Aug. 2004).
255
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 2(2).
256
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 8(2).
257
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 9.
258
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 9(2).
259
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 2(4).
260
Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 4(5).
261
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 8(2).
262
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 2(2).
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Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it has assumed with regard to investments
made in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party.
Admittedly, given the dearth of investment treaty arbitrations involving Cuba and the acute dissonance among international arbitral
tribunals on their appropriate construction and application,263 the
reach of Cuban umbrella clauses remains rather uncertain.264
I. Inter-temporal Application
Besides thoroughly understanding the substantive safeguards
available to foreign investors under the wide universe of Cuban
BIT’s, it is essential to closely scrutinize their inter-temporal application. While clearly protecting foreign investments made on or after their date of effectiveness, Cuban BITs are also applicable to foreign investments legally existing in Cuba before their entry into
force. Such is the case of Cuba’s BITs with, for instance, the Netherlands,265 Slovakia,266 Greece,267 Lebanon,268 Argentina,269

263

The doctrinal divergence emerging in the wake of the jurisdictional awards
in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, Aug. 6, 2003 and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 29, 2004, has only widened in the
ensuing years.
264
Even in the face of a Cuban BIT having no umbrella clause, an international arbitral tribunal may very well find that by operation of that BIT’s MFN
clause Cuba is “obliged to extend [that] same Treaty protection of contractual
commitments” to the foreign investor of a contracting state with whom no umbrella clause was agreed. See e.g. Impregilo, S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 221 (Apr. 22, 2005),
available at http:/icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C
224/DC642_En.pdf.
265
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 10.
266
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 11.
267
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 13.
268
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 10.
269
Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 1.
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Chile,270 Hungary,271 Guatemala,272 Bolivia,273 Peru,274 Venezuela,275 Switzerland,276 Romania,277 Portugal,278 Mexico,279 and
Germany.280 Article 10 of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT neatly encapsulates this approach,
The provisions of this Agreement shall, from the date
of entry into force thereof, also apply to investments
that legally exist on that date, but they shall not apply
to investment disputes which arouse before its entry
into force.281
Thus, the exercise of identifying the precise point in time at
which the legal dispute between the foreign investor and the Cuban
Republic crystallized will become outcome–determinative with respect to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione temporis. Interestingly, Article 24(2) of the Cuba-Austria BIT offers the parties a
more time- specific approach, denying coverage to “claims which
have been settled or dispute procedures which have been initiated
prior to its entry into force.”282 Other Cuban BITs, while extending
coverage to foreign investments made before their entry into force,
remain silent as to whether disputes existing prior to that date are

270

Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 2.
Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 11.
272
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. II.
273
Id. at art. X.
274
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11.
275
Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 2.
276
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Cuba on
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. Cuba-Switzerland BIT,
supra note 69, at art. 2.
277
Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at, art. 6.
278
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 11.
279
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 2.
280
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 9.
281
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 10 (emphasis added).
282
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 24(2) (emphasis added).
271
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covered or not under the BIT. Cuba’s BITs with, for example, Turkey,283 Vietnam,284 Spain,285 Italy,286 United Kingdom,287 Barbados,288 Indonesia,289 and China,290 stand for this proposition. In particular, Article VIII(1) of the Cuba-Turkey BIT establishes in part
that:
This Agreement shall be applicable to the investments which are operating legally on the date of its
entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter.291
Arguably, determining the retroactive reach of those BITs
adopting the above-referenced language will no doubt befall on the
international arbitral tribunal itself, as it carves out the metes and
bounds of its own jurisdiction ratione temporis. Prospective protection, following termination, is yet an additional safeguard invariably
present in Cuba’s BITs. Under an important number of these treaties, foreign investments made on Cuban soil prior to the termination
of the relevant BIT will “continue to be effective for a period of ten
years from the date of termination.”292 This is true for Cuba’s BITs
with, among others, Slovakia,293 Greece,294 Spain,295 Indonesia,296

283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(1).
Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 10.
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. II(2).
Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 13.
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13.
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12.
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. X.
Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 11.
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(1).
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(3) (emphasis added).
Id.
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(3).
Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XII(2).
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. XIII(2).
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China,297 Hungary,298 Guatemala,299 Peru,300 Venezuela,301 Turkey,302 Austria,303 Portugal,304 Argentina,305 and Vietnam.306
Likewise, Cuba’s BIT’s with Germany307 and Switzerland308
provide identical post-termination protection but for a period of 20
years following their expiration. The Cuban-Chilean309 and CubanDutch treaties,310 for example, limit such post-termination protection to 15 years, while the Cuban-Italian treaty311 further reduces it
to a 5-year period. Under Cuba’s BITs with Romania,312 Bolivia,313
and Lebanon,314 all of which offer post-termination protection, the
10-year period begins to run as of the date one of the contracting
states to the BIT tenders an official notice denouncing the treaty. For
their part, Cuba’s BITs with the United Kingdom,315 Barbados,316
and France317 explicitly limit their 20-year post-termination protection only to those foreign investments made while the treaty was in
force. The Cuba-Mexico BIT reproduces this same arrangement, but
only with 10 years of post-termination protection.318
It is not uncommon for Cuban BITs to enjoy terms of maturity
of 10 or even 15 years,319 with the possibility of tacit extensions for
297

Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 13(4).
Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(3).
299
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. XI(3).
300
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(4).
301
Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(3).
302
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(4).
303
Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 26(3).
304
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(3).
305
Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 10(2).
306
Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(3).
307
Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 13(3).
308
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 13(2).
309
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(3).
310
Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(3).
311
Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 15(2).
312
Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(2).
313
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(3).
314
Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 12(2).
315
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14.
316
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13.
317
Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 12.
318
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(3).
319
For BIT’s enjoying terms of maturity of ten years see, e.g., Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art.
298
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periods of two,320 five,321 or even 10 years,322 unless denounced
within one-year323 or six months324 of their expiration dates. Cuban
BITs, moreover, will usually enter into full force and effect following the exchange of ratification instruments between the Cuban Republic and the other contracting state, in accordance with their respective domestic legislations.

12(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 26(2); CubaPeru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art.
12(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra
note 65, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 12; Cuba-Portugal
BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(2); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13;
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(2); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note
77, at art. 13(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1); Cuba-United
Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14; Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at
art. 10(1); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT,
supra note 69, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); CubaVietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(1); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art.
XII(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 15(1). For BITs with terms of maturity of 15 years see, e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(1);
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(2).
320
See Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XII(1).
321
See,e.g., Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(1); Cuba-Italy BIT,
supra note 70, at art. 15(1).
322
See, e.g., Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Bolivia
BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1);
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59,
at art. 12(2).
323
See, e.g., Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Hungary
BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(2);
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60,
at art. 12(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Turkey BIT,
supra note 65, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(2);
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13; Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77,
at art. 13(2); Cuba- United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14; Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 10(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art.
13(1); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra
note 70, at art. 15(1).
324
See, e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Peru
BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1);
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64,
at art. 12(2).
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V. CONCLUSION: A LEGAL MINEFIELD?
As Cuba navigates along uncharted waters, its capacity to attract
significant inflows of DFI will prove decisive.
For Cuba, there will be no sustainability without robust economic growth. In the Cuban context, however, this necessarily requires the restructuring of the island’s institutional repertoire.
More specifically, Cuba’s ability to attract and preserve high
volumes of DFI is closely intertwined to the island’s willingness to
delocalize the dispute settlement mechanisms available to foreign
investors doing business in Cuban territory.
The cogency of its domestic legal superstructure and, more importantly, the degree to which its domestic legal order can coherently interact with the international legal order will no doubt prove
decisive in attracting DFI.
For Cuba, however, the future still looks rather uncertain. Besides the obvious complexities surrounding the deconstruction of the
United States’ anachronistic blockade, Cuba faces today a myriad of
unanswered questions and tough policy options.
And among the more prominent policy choices facing the Cuban
Republic, in its quest to woo foreign investment, is deciding whether
to open itself fully to investment treaty arbitration.
On the one hand, Cuba’s signing of a wide universe of BITs with
countries from around the globe, if taken together with its ratification of the New York Convention and Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, goes to show a long-standing pro international arbitration policy that predates today’s geopolitical juncture.
Yet, on the other hand, the very small number of investment
treaty arbitrations involving Cuba together with the policy and legal
imponderables surrounding the island’s endogenous institutional
repertoire, bring to the surface the long road ahead for solidifying
the hold of international arbitration in Cuba’s legal culture.
The first challenge facing investment treaty arbitration in Cuba
is the uncertain status of treaties in Cuba’s domestic law. Admittedly, Article 20 of the Cuban Civil Code325 establishes that in the
case of conflict between a treaty and a provision of the Civil Code,
325

CÓD CIV. art. 20 (Cuba)(“Si un acuerdo o un tratado internacional del que
Cuba sea parte establece reglas diferentes a las expresadas en los artículos anteriores o no contenida en ellos, se aplican las reglas de dicho acuerdo o tratado.”).
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the treaty controls. This notwithstanding, it is not at all clear in the
Cuban Constitution or in Decree-Law No. 191 of 1999326 how and
when treaties become a part of Cuban domestic law or their hierarchy relative to domestic legislation. While obviously not a monist
state in the Dutch sense,327 the Cuban Republic has yet to articulate
with greater clarity a rule of treaty transubstantiation into domestic
law.
Arguably, the second challenge besieging investment treaty arbitration in Cuba is the uncertainty surrounding the almost inevitable interactions between the Cuban and international legal orders;
particularly in the context of parallel proceedings.
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Cuba will,
no doubt, raise complex legal and policy questions in Cuban courts
in light of Havana’s disavowal of the ICSID Convention and the
New York Convention’s escape hatches.
Amidst the uncertainty, however, it is a foregone conclusion that
Cuba’s legal superstructure will undergo important transformations
as it attempts to cope with ever- higher volumes of DFI. Sustainability hinges on the Cuban Republic’s willingness to fully incorporate itself to the global markets. At a time when Washington and
Havana attempt to chart a new geopolitical understanding that will
no doubt test the vitality of Cuba’s BITs, no other aspect of Cuban
foreign investment law is as pertinent as its dispute settlement mechanisms. On their cogency, coherence, and predictability (or lack
thereof), depends in great measure the survival of the Cuban national project.
Time is of the essence.

326
Published in the Official Gazette of the Cuban Republic on March 12,
1999, Decree-Law No. 191 stands today as the definitive norm regulating the Cuban Republic’s accession to bilateral and multilateral treaties.
327
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS Sept. 22,
2008, art. 91(3) (“Any provision of a treaty that conflicts with the Constitution or
which leads to conflicts with it may be approved by the Houses of the States General only if at least two-thirds of the votes cast are in favor.”) The Cuban Constitution, contrary to its Dutch counterpart, is clearly the supreme legal norm in Cuban territory and controls over all else, including treaties.

